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U.S.-Pakistani relations must be reevaluated

Michael Bain

Last Sunday, fearing a unanimous ruling by the Pakistani Supreme Court that would declare him ineligible to serve as president, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf declared a state of national emergency and curtailed political rights in a step toward securing his grip on power.

He also postponed upcoming parliamentary elections, and arrested scores of human rights activists, lawyers and opposition party members. Yet, while the U.S. has remained remarkably silent with regard to the events of last weekend, and it appears as if billions of dollars of American aid will continue to be funneled to the Pakistani military, Americans must remain cognizant of the long-term implications of supporting an unpopular autocrat in a Muslim country with a substantial nuclear arsenal.

The case for continuing to support Musharraf has its merits, as the cause of uprooting the Taliban and al-Qaeda forces that have entrenched themselves along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border is a critical one.

The continued presence of these forces threatens not only the United States, but also the stability of the region.

Moreover, there is the risk that, in a country where Osama bin Laden has been polling higher numbers than Musharraf, fair and free elections could allow radical elements into the parliament.

Indeed, Musharraf's government is claiming that the United States' interests now depend more upon stability than upon democracy.

However, what this view fails to address are the long-term failures of Musharraf to significantly crack down on Taliban and al-Qaeda elements in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs).

If these past failures had simply been a desire on the part of the regime to avoid the political costs of launching major military operations into the FATAs, then Musharraf may now be in a better position to go after militants.

On the other hand, if his hesitancy was prompted in part by the decades old entanglement of Pakistani army officers with Taliban tribal leaders, Musharraf's ability to crack down on terrorist forces in the FATAs may actually be weakened.

Critical to eroding these networks have been American attempts to demonstrate to the Pakistani people that the U.S. is partnered with Pakistan for the long haul, and is interested in human development and the rule of law. Continued U.S. support of a despotic Musharraf regime could further alienate Pakistani moderates, radicalize the population and pave the way for an eventual Islamist backlash.

Bhutto and her opposition party have recently polled favorably. However, if moderate opposition is long suppressed, history has demonstrated that people will seek more radical routes for change.

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Ultimately, the question of supporting Musharraf begs an analysis of short-term returns in exchange for long-term costs.

If President Musharraf can indeed take significant steps to destroy Taliban and al-Qaeda networks in the FATAs, then perhaps continued U.S. support is warranted.

Nonetheless, anything short of this may grant short-term stability at the expense of long-term radicalization, and a heightened sense of resentment toward the United States.