Established 1826 — Oldest College Newspaper West of the Alleghenies

U.S. must adopt sound long-term Pakistan strategy

In the ongoing fight against the Taliban and Al Qaeda in central Asia, the case of Pakistan presents some key problems for U.S. policy makers. Nearly six years after the September 11 attacks, and despite more than 10 billion dollars of American military and development funding, as well as strong political support for the Musharraf government, the Taliban remains firmly established in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs) along the Afghanistan border.

Frustrated by what they see as a lack of resolve on behalf of President Musharraf to take a tougher military stance against jihadists operating along the border and to sever military ties with the Taliban, there has been talk this summer among U.S. lawmakers of leveraging the Pakistani regime with cuts in aid, should more substantial progress in the field not be made.

However, while there is clearly a strategic necessity to eliminate a cross-border safe haven for radical Islamists, American leaders must be sensitive to the delicate political realities of Pakistani domestic politics, while reevaluating the United States' broader development goals for the country and committing to a policy of active engagement.

Fundamentally, the issue at stake is whether cutting aid to President Musharraf will advance our fight against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The challenge is that the United States must support a somewhat stable, military regime, while seeking to compel that regime to accept the political and military consequences of taking on the radicals near the border. This is made more difficult by the entanglement of the Pakistani army with Taliban tribal leaders in the FATAs. These associations have lasted for decades and are viewed by many Pakistanis as being beneficial alliances in the event of U.S. disengagement from the region or future conflict with India.

The United States must demonstrate its commitment to Pakistani interests in order to address its own. Policies of greater active engagement should be initiated between U.S. and Pakistani military and intelligence services, fostering trust while sharing resources and information.

From a longer term perspective, development aid should be focused on building stability and the rule of law, and dealing with training police, judges, and prosecutors in addition to the military. This is not to say that so called "human development" should be ignored, but funding should be prioritized. Programs that contribute to institution building could help guard against future political turmoil by strengthening the Pakistani state. Indeed, with the recent Pakistani Supreme Court ruling that allows for the return of Narwaz Sharif, the former prime minister and Musharraf political rival, many analysts are predicting the beginning of the end for the current president's regime. U.S. policy must take into account the possibility of imminent regime change or an ensuing political alliance between the two leaders.

Ultimately, pressure to act on radicals in the FATAs can be achieved by demonstrating a long-term American willingness to remain steadfast in our engagement with Pakistan, while advocating for reform and targeting development funding towards stabilizing ends. Likewise, the U.S. must also remember the importance of broader regional engagement, bolstering military operations in Afghanistan and working diplomatically to reduce tensions over Kashmir.

It is too simplistic to advocate that slashing U.S. aid would send a message to the Musharraf regime and compel the army to turn on the Taliban. Furthermore, classic examples of U.S. dissengagement have rarely advanced our strategic interests, be it in Palestine, Cuba, North Korea, or Iran. Rather, "commitment" pressure will further U.S. counter terrorism goals, while simultaneously working towards longer term structural solutions.


Enjoy what you're reading?
Signup for our newsletter