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Peace talks must include enemies, allies for success

Morgan Riedl

It's not realistic to expect to engage only friendly regimes and accomplish anything of importance. There is no logic in ignoring those who perpetuate the very problems the world finds most threatening. Solving these problems is obviously contingent on the compliance of those parties contributing to them. It should come as no surprise that the world often finds these parties offensive, but excluding them from attempts to resolve the conflicts they cause is inherently futile. While allies will naturally find compromise amongst themselves comparatively easier (though divergent national interests assure that even this process will not be void of complications) than comprise with enemies, the resulting resolution will not be much of a solution at all. To achieve a sustainable peace, negotiations must involve all parties, especially those likely to spoil the prospect of peace.

The problem is that this administration has often labeled those hostile parties that are so critical to the peace process as terrorist organizations and then promptly refused to talk with them. This moral victory does little to disguise the inevitable policy failure that follows. Four years after being named as part of the "axis of evil" and diplomatically ostracized, North Korea tested a nuclear weapon. So much for non-proliferation. Now, two years later, the United States finds direct talks are "productive." Of course anything is more productive than standing by, even if that means standing on the high ground. That is the point in all of this, though. Negotiations are messy and complex; it's inescapable. The very definition of compromise implies an imperfect solution, but a solution nonetheless. Those who are determined to live in a world in which the "wrong" side never triumphs are merely deluding themselves. The fact is regimes sponsoring conflict exist whether the United States acknowledges them or not. If the United States wants, as it purports to and as it should, to bring an end to these threats, the sponsors need to be included in the process.

Jimmy Carter's meeting with Hamas was a bold step toward bringing lasting peace to the region. Among the administration critical of Carter's efforts, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice did not want the trip to create the misperception that Hamas was part of the negotiations between Israel and Palestine. The fear is misplaced. The real worry should stem from the fact that Hamas is not included. Suppose the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations make real progress. That progress will be susceptible to sabotage by Hamas. Since the group will have no place in whatever co-existence plan is devised, it will have no stake in maintaining the system. In fact, its exclusion might be motivation enough to disrupt the process. The spoiling of negotiations is not without precedent, and the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations are fragile even without the complication of the added dimension of Hamas.

Beside preventing the possible breakdown of talks, Hamas needs to be engaged because it controls the Gaza Strip. Whether such power is recognized as legitimate or not, it is a fact. A report released earlier this month noted a marked military build-up by Hamas. One reason is that Hamas feels the need to arm to protect Gaza. A counter explanation maintains the group is mounting force for an aggressive campaign against Israel. Either way, a reduction in armaments is desirable. Convincing Hamas to limit its weapons would require, at the very least, talking to the group. Arms limitation cannot be imposed from the outside. Clearly, the border control was ineffective in preventing arms trafficking or such a build-up would not have been noticeable.

If the former explanation for the build-up is accurate, then there is reason to assume Hamas is, as it claims to be, open to a long-term truce. The recent rejection of Hamas' proposal for a six-month truce is disappointing, although the gesture itself, indicative of Hamas's willingness to come to the table, inspires some hope. While the connection cannot be made on the basis of any official evidence, it is notable that such an offer came following Carter's visit. While the hesitation to believe the sincerity of the proposal is well-grounded, refusing it on that basis alone seems almost irresponsible. While Israel fears such a truce would be used by Hamas to prepare for later fighting, the truce itself would not have to be the end of negotiations. Indeed, the hope would be to use it as a foundation on which to build. Bringing Hamas into a negotiating process is the best approach to prevent the group's perceived need to engage in future violence.

Although it is understandable that states do not want to confer legitimacy to hostile regimes or terrorists, the effort is ultimately counterproductive. These groups often desire recognition and perpetuate violence to get it. Acknowledging their existence, their point of view and their concerns without agreeing or validating them, is not a sign of weakness, but an acceptance of reality. The labeling of regimes is a political tool that allows states to justify maintaining relationships with certain parties and not with others. But too often it's used as an excuse to avoid making the hard decisions, the ones that garner just as much criticism as praise, that require true concessions, and allow for real steps forward.